The article by Garry Kasparov and Mikhail Khodorkovsky “Don’t Fear Putin’s Demise: Victory for Ukraine, Democracy for Russia” appeared in Foreign Affairs on January 20, 2023. Written by prominent critics of Putin’s regime who reside abroad, such an article could not appear before the full-blown Russian invasion in Ukraine. The visions for the Russian future that the article offers would appear too radical and implausible before the full-blown invasion. They would be dismissed before being printed. The full-blown invasion changed everything. In a sort of frantic desperation, many began fantasizing about the possibility of the Russian futures that would offer a solution to the war and halt the unfolding catastrophes.
It should be said that to many who follow closely the events of the war since the day of the invasion, or from before–remembering that Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014–the fantasies about the Russian future appear to be if not offending to sensibilities then premature. Particularly the visions related to democracy, European integration, future NATO membership for Russia (as some Russian oppositionists floated on Twitter), and other optimistic musings arise annoyance. These visions appear untimely and tone deaf to many, and the reason is clear. It is difficult to imagine a “beautiful Russia of the future,” as the Russian liberal oppositionists began imagining, just while Russia is razing cities to the ground, conducts “referendums” on the occupied Ukrainian territory, pops “filtration” camps on the occupied territories, and commits violations of human rights on an industrial scale.
However, it is necessary to talk about the future for Russia because the outcome of the war depends on how the world imagines such a future. Kasparov and Khodorkovsky do exactly that, proclaiming from the beginning of the article that the Putin’s regime is “living on the borrowed time…If the West holds firm, Putin’s regime will collapse in the near future.” Unfortunately, they do not clarify why they make such an assumptions, as, of course, it is entirely possible, too, that Russia will lose the war but the regime will survive, either with Putin or his successor.
Many think that in Russia, there are no mechanisms of passing on the highest seat of power. This is incorrect; there is such a mechanism historically: the ruler is passing on the power to the successor. The mechanism isn’t a monarchy, where the power is passed along the hereditary lines regulated by the questions of who follows whom. The mechanism isn’t an electoral system where the new leader is being elected. Yet the mechanism exists, it was established by Yeltsin, and Putin is its result. This is a mechanism of appointing a successor.
Suppose the mechanism of appointing a successor fails, no warlords emerge to vie for power, no clique of siloviki usurps the presidential seat, and the structure that Kasparov and Khodorkovsky created, that they call The Russian Action Committee, receives a chance to transform Russia “from a rogue dictatorship into a parliamentary federal republic.”
Kasparov and Khodorkovsky argue that the West must overcome its fear of victory and reluctance to supply Ukraine with weapons, that the collapse of Putin’s regime are the welcome development that should be sped up, and in this, I entirely agree with them, but for different reasons. Putting these reasons aside for the time being, I propose to look into what they offer for Russia after the regime’s collapse. Here, we are going to assume that what they predict comes true and cut to that moment where their plan has a chance.
One has to assume that this Russian Action Committee, that consists of long-standing Putin’s critics who are immigrants, mean Kasparov and Khodorkovsky and their team, and that they will be accompanied by the NATO military in their quest at least for the time of transitionary period when it will become possible for Russia to move on to the next form of governance.
Kasparov and Khodorkovsky mention that all the territories of Ukraine that Russia occupied need to be liberated from Russia’s military presence, Russia needs to pay reparations, and give away war criminals. This program favorably distinguishes them from other figures of the Russian “anti-war movement” that may simply state “stop the war” without clarifying that the occupied territories need to return under Ukraine’s control, the “referendums” denounced as wrongful and “undone” in popular Russian imaginaries.
Kasparov and Khodorkovsky observe that restoring Ukraine’s control, and Russia paying of reparations and giving away war criminals are possible as the result of a decisive Russia’s defeat on the battlefield. With this in view, they call on Biden’s administration to provide Ukraine with all the necessary weapons for such an outcome of the war. They make a case that the West must fear the continual survival of Putin’s regime and further militarization of centralized Russia more than the West should fear the collapse of Russia with its nuclear arsenal and falling of Russia in the dependence of China. Again, I agree, but the vision of the future that they offer is implausible.
Why Is The Future That Kasparov and Khodorkovsky Offer Implausible
The future of Russia that will ensue as a result of a decisive defeat as far as Khodorkovsky and Kasparov portray it appears to be a version of the past. The Russian Federation has already tried it, and it didn’t work. They write:
“For nearly two decades, some Western pundits have claimed that the Russian people will never accept democracy and that Russia is doomed to revanchism. Indeed, Putin’s propaganda has managed to instill in a sizable segment of Russian society the view that Western values are entirely alien to Russia. But economic integration with the West has enabled other countries to overcome a fascist heritage. And deeper integration with Europe, coupled with the conditional easing of Western sanctions, could help Russia do the same.
In the aftermath of Putin’s military defeat, Russia would have to choose: either become a vassal of China or begin reintegrating with Europe (having first justly compensated Ukraine for the damage inflicted during the war and punished those guilty of war crimes). For the majority of Russians, the choice in favor of peace, freedom, and flourishing would be obvious—and made even more so by the rapid reconstruction of Ukraine.”
Kasparov and Khodorkovsky’s plan for Russia is democracy and European integration, and they assume, based on their own preferences, that the “majority of Russians” will prefer to Eurointegrate to Russia becoming “a vassal of China.” Falling in the dependence of China is indeed unfortunate and a concern, but with Europe being portrayed by the regular Russian propaganda as “Satanic” (see Solovyov’s media appearances) and a nest of all sorts of vices, where does this certainty come from that the majority of Russians will look at the prospects of European integration as appealing? What Russian immigrants may see as “peace, freedom, and flourishing,” may in fact be perceived and is often presented in the writings of the Russian nationalists as loss of sovereignty, falling out of true beliefs, being spoiled by consumerism, loss of traditional values, and so on. Why would then a “choice” between Eurointegration and what Russians may not see as “becoming a vassal of China” be made in favor of Eurointegration by the majority of Russians?
They also gloss over the cornerstones of the issues, compensation of Ukraine for damages and giving away war criminals for the international tribunal, putting those in parentheses as if these are some issues easily resolved. We need to be talking who exactly, who, and through which mechanisms will be compensating Ukraine, and who will give away war criminals considering that there are probably few officials in Russia who are not implicated in such a massive war.
And Khodorkovsky and Kasparov do offer some solution for that. They say that it will be necessary “to draw a clear line between war criminals and former regime operatives—offering various forms of compromise with the latter to better assure a peaceful transition.” Meaning, deputinization will need to make some compromises in choosing between the ones who actively supported the war, who will be tried, and the ones who only operated within their functions without being vocal supporters. Given that the whole country is implicated in the war, such distinction will in practice be made by the people based on their understanding of who did what, and what kind of responsibility they should bear.
At every step of the way, in short, Kasparov and Khodorkovsky’s visions appear difficult to make a reality. Whole sets of laws and regulations will have to be written to create those possibilities. It is important to keep this conversation going, and every technicality no doubt can be resolved. There are deeper problems with the whole picture however.
These deeper problems are that the course on democratization and Eurointegration, much as they are desirable and necessary for Russia, is a tried course that failed. It has already been assumed that through the economic integration Russian expansionist ambitions will be curtailed. Thus, making Germany economy dependent on Russian oil and gas was supposed to make Russia dependent on German consumption. The European Union and its members were supposed to have leverage over Russian decisions in foreign affairs due to them being Russian customers. This delusion ran so deep that even after the first Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and occupation of Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, this course was not changed. This course failed utterly and completely in 2022. It is necessary to first acknowledge the fact that the previous course failed. Meanwhile, we keep hearing the adepts of “real politik” calling to return to “business as usual” with Russia at the earliest opportunity because no other alternative supposedly exists.
In short, it would not appear that Kasparov and Khodorkovsky offer something that was not tried and failed. They do not mention the program of de-imperialization of Russian mentality, and the process of decolonization that Russia must undergo before democratization would begin making sense, and somebody who are not representing versions of Z ideas will have a chance at the free elections.
Reasons Why We Must Will for Ukraine’s Victory
In other words, I remain unconvinced that Russia has as much as a change for a new round of Eurointegration and democratization in the observable future. However, I also have to highlight here that there is an urgent need to restore Ukraine’s control on all the Ukrainian territory, but for a set of entirely different reasons. Not because that brings another chance to Russia, but because the implications of allowing Russia to solidify the occupation of part of the neighboring state and claim any sort of victory will have too many reaching consequences for everybody. A scenario in which Russia plausibly claims a “victory” is opening up another chapter in the history of the world. In this chapter borders are up to revisions based on the principle of the right of the might, nuclear blackmail works, a bigger state can invade a smaller neighboring state under flimsy pretexts, conduct referendums and announce annexations, and conduct forced passportization. The consequences of allowing this would be dramatic. Other states would be tempted to do the same convinced that they will get away with it.
Anthropology and Dust 