Collapse of Russia: “Dangerously Dumb Delusion” or the Imminence Ahead?

In March 2013, in The Hill, an article by Christopher McCallion was published that attracted my attention with its title “Russian disintegration is a dangerously dumb delusion.” The title is appealing in its ambiguity: delusion in what sense? Whose delusion is (the prospect of) Russian disintegration? The article mentions some recent articles on decolonization, decentralization, and disintegration of Russia, which appeared recently in numbers they did not before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. As the author observed, “Many analysts and commentators have been making pronouncements that a year ago they would not have dared to even imagine, including Ukraine retaking Crimea, or the downfall of the Russian government.”

Indeed, it was difficult to imagine that the discourse about the break up of the Russian Federation into an unknown number of sovereignties that potentially are capable of rising in such a vast space would gain prominence if there was no full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The author then quotes some of the most prominent Russian figures, such as Putin and Medvedev, who, either before or after the invasion, fearmongered about the West wanting to disband Russia. That these people, both of whom are directly responsible for the war and for the deaths of hundreds of thousands get a respectful quote in The Hill like some thinkers worthy of being listened to after one year of a disaster that is war is remarkable, in a sense.

Perhaps the statements of the journalists and writers in the West that Russia will collapse are irresponsible and wishful thinking, as the author points out. However, why similarly irresponsible statements by the Russian officials are quoted side by side like some examples of balanced view is unclear. Putin and Medvedev fearmongered about the West wanting Russia’s collapse. They did everything, each in his place, to make it a reality, including the full-blown invasion of Ukraine, aggressive rhetoric, and weekly nuclear threats. Finally, their fears came true: the West is now reviewing the idea. Were it not for the invasion, the conversation about the collapse of Russia would indeed remain somewhere on the margins of the political and perhaps proliferate somewhere in the forums of nutjobs. However, you see, there was this invasion. That changed quite a bit in the public perception of Russia, and it is not entirely fair to put the onus of this change of perception on those whose perceptions were changed. Something changed it.

The reason why the prospect of the collapse of the Russian Federation is being discussed is that such a prospect is not completely unlikely. The Russian imperialist war of land-grab with the reconfigurations of borders has been accompanied by the statements of Putin to the effect that the people themselves can decide to form republics and pursue independence. The recognition by Putin of the Russia-created “two breakaway republics” in Ukraine, with the subsequent incorporation of them into the Russian Federation, opens the question that is not going to be quenched by the well-meaning columns. The question is, if such republics can form in Ukraine and be absorbed by Russia, what ground is there for not forming of similar republics within Russia, with or without a view of them being absorbed by other states? Among national elites of the colonized nations within the Russian Federation, nearly everyone read this opening as an invitation to imagine a future for the sovereignties of their respective states. More so because while “DPR” and “LPR” are the quasi-entities that have no separate national identity beyond them, in Russia, many regions have their own histories of statehood, national and ethnic identities, languages and cultures, and so on.

A discussion of the prospect of the collapse of the Russian Federation is necessary because the prospect is real. Just because these discussions will not be happening, and Christopher McCallion seems to suggest they should not, does not mean that the prospect becomes less real–it merely promises less readiness to meet the not unlikely prospect coming into realization. While Western thinkers may have their positions about such a prospect, the representatives of the national intelligentsia of the colonized peoples of Russia have their own positions. It would be great if such columns paid attention to the ideas of this intelligentsia, or at least acknowledged their existence and the need for them to be adequately represented in the discussion.

One might agree with the warning that the breaking of the Russian Federation is dangerous. Three familiar arguments against the forceful breaking of the Russian Federation are offered in the column: the loss of control over nuclear weapons, the falling of the resulting republics in the dependence from China, and a prospect of the blowback “on our own humble multiethnic empire.” Some of these arguments are reasonable, but they seem to exist in a world that did not suffer the Russian full-blown invasion of Ukraine. Currently, Russian propagandists threaten the world with nuclear weapons weekly, if not daily. The situation is volatile and unstable. There is no prospect to extract those nuclear weapons from Russia. Could it be easier for the world to convince the resulting entities to denuclearize than it is to convince Moscow? The prospect of denuclearization of entities in exchange of the lifting of sanctions and development of international relations with the republics may not be a ready roadmap, but it is at least worth considering. While it is clear that it is going to be complicated, it is not easier to talk with Moscow about limits to nuclear proliferation and not using nuclear weapons.

The argument of the prospective dependence of entities on China takes a particularly interesting rendition in the column.

“Even if Russia fractured without a nuclear catastrophe along the way, there’s little reason to think this would be to the geostrategic benefit of the United States, which faces a far more formidable challenge in a rising China. Were a series of new states to proliferate in Russia’s vast, resource rich but sparsely-populated east, they quite possibly would become satellites of China. By contrast, a unified Russia provides a lumbering giant to divert some of Beijing’s strategic attention away from the Pacific and to limit its command of Central and Northeastern Asia.”

Of course, weeks passed after the article was written and published, and as readers, we have the benefit of “knowing the future.” Three days ago, Bloomberg reported that “China’s yuan replaces the U.S. dollar as the most traded currency in Russia.” Taken in the context of the visit of Xi to Putin after the ICC issued an arrest warrant of Putin for the war crime that is mass deportation of Ukrainian children, that presents a challenge. The idea that Russia can be a buffer and diversion for China is dubious in this context. Is it better for the totality of the Russian Federation to become a sphere of influence of China than for some areas to become satellites of China? Should Russia become the satellite of China as a whole, in a centralized manner?

Finally, the prospect of blowback that is expecting “our own humble multiethnic empire,” again leads me to the question, whose–“our own”? Who is included in the concept of “our own humble multiethnic empire,” and who is not? In the Western universities–and there is a huge push-back against it–there are centers and scholars who critique the “multiethnic empire” of the West. Volumes are written on the history, brutality, and decolonization of Western colonialisms. There are movements of liberation, activism, and movements for racial and ethnic justice. Do “we” have to suppress them “here” because we don’t want them to gain prominence in Russia? Or all these conversations and discourses can be applied only to Western colonialisms but not Russian colonialism, since the conversations about Russian colonialism pose such dangers to Western colonialisms?

This last argument about danger to Western colonialism that the discourse of the decolonization of Russia poses may appeal to many. I have encountered statements to the effect that decolonization of Russia means American settler colonialists need to return the land to the indigenous populations of the continent of North America. Of all the arguments, the argument “we should not wish the decolonization on Russia because it might lead to our own decolonization” seems to be one of the more self-defeating arguments. This is an old colonial fear that “they will do unto us how we did to them,” which is an ultimate admission that what was done was wrong.

We must radically imagine a better future for all ethnicities. A better future for all does not mean swiping under the rug the uncomfortable realizations of the violence of colonialism and how badly it messed up the “what was to be” for many peoples and nations. That imagining will not be equating everyone, in the style of “all lives matter,” regardless of whether they played the role of the colonized or the colonizer. A radically better future for all ethnicities does include retributions. And indeed, the prospect of decolonization of Russia must open the spaces to discuss the possibilities, ways, and forms of decolonization of the West. This is not to be feared but rather embraced. This is about “making the world livable for human differences.”

A revolutionary holding a sunflower. Image by AI Midjourney, curated by the author of the blog.

Decolonized Russia: “Libya with Nukes” or New Beginnings?

A month ago, an essay appeared in Politico that reflects the West’s anxiety at the face of Russia’s defeat in Ukraine. The essay is titled “Libya with nukes: Is the West ready for Putin to lose?” The author, Matthew Karnitschnig, begins with a dramatic statement “Close your eyes and imagine a world without Russia,” in a (possibly accidental) reference to the meme with a portrait of John Lennon and the caption, “Imagine there’s no Russia.” The essay warns against the prospect of the disintegration of Russia as something people should be careful of wishing into existence as the disintegration of Russia brings familiar scarecrows.

Russia disintegrated is likely to repeat the scenarios “of Afghanistan of the 1990s or present-day Libya” with a land torn between various warlordships. Undesirable scenarios include nuclear wars between those warlordships, waves of refugees, broken supply chains, further collapsing markets between Russia and Europe, and humanitarian catastrophes.

Indeed, there is no scenario that potentially cannot become worse. The fall of a dictator no more necessarily brings a democracy like exiting out of the window of the 21st floor necessarily delivers one to the 22nd floor.

On the other hand, and here one has to object to the author, a big war is already happening under the condition of Russia being united against Ukraine, a country that is demographically and economically was obviously at a disadvantage at the start of the invasion, the Russian Federation has already created a multi-million refugee crises. In Ukraine, according to various estimates, around 10 million people are either refugees or internally displaced. Russia also contributed to the Syrian refugee wave that, according to various estimates, could be as big as 8 million people. Russian officials already threaten nukes on every occasion. The breaking of the supply lines between Russia and Europe is something that sanctions potentially should involve for Russia to become unable to wage war against Ukraine. In other words, some of those threats are not a matter of the future but have already been here, so they do not produce as much impression as before. Furthermore, why is Ukraine being made to sacrifice itself for the sake of keeping Russia united isn’t clear.

“Scenarios range from uprisings among Russia’s more than 20 ethnic territories sprinkled across the country’s 11 time zones to a full-scale descent into the kind of conflict and lawlessness that has gripped Libya since the fall of its dictator Muammar Gaddafi,” writes Matthew Karnitschnig.

While this may not be without ground, I imagine people from these “20 ethnic territories” who envision their nations to be independent from Moscow’s government that they may perceive as colonial cannot be too pleased to read that their dreams are dismissed as something that the rational actor would not embrace.

Karnitschnig points out that an open discussion about these issues among the officials can hardly happen given that Russia is an open belligerent and the moods of the Russian officials are heightened.

Nevertheless, one has to point out, the conversation is already happening among officials and pundits alike, with a sheer volume of essays about (de)federalization, decolonization, and decentralization of Russia going off the charts compared to years of the topics dwelling on the margins of public discourse.

That is because whether we wish it or not, one or another scenario of the defederalization of the Russian Federation seems likely, and not discussing it, therefore, does not help.

Another reason why the West avoids embracing the topic that the collapse of the Russian Federation is among the possibilities is so that the officials do not give additional reasons for the Russian officials, such as Putin and Medvedev, to weaponize such conversations highlighting them as the confirmation that the West does indeed want to destroy Russia.

However, on the other hand, again, Putin and Medvedev already attempt to raise the stakes in their war by presenting it as existential to Russia and the war in which Russia’s survival is at stake.

Furthermore, Katnitschig informs us that “Unlike the Soviet Union, where half of the citizens were non-Russian, 80 percent of the population of modern-day Russia identifies as Russian.”

There are regional identities that do not necessarily contradict being a Russian but rather present a different ground for unification such as “Siberian.” The Russian latest census was conducted with numerous inaccuracies. There are regions in Russia where the majority is not Russian. A contemporary state that is keeping the taxes locally as opposed to passing them on to Moscow does not have to be a nation state and does not have to be built around ethnicites. The result of British, French, or Spanish colonialisms are a bunch of countries whose citizens speak English or Spanish without identifying themselves as British, French, or Spaniard. The result of Russian colonialism can be a bunch of countries where former “Russians” live.

Potentially, Katnischig points out, the dissolution of the Russian Federation is going to be much bloodier than the disbandment of the USSR: “

The most important factor preventing bloodshed in 1991 was that Russia didn’t object to dismantling the Soviet Union. It’s difficult to imagine that either Putin or a potential successor would idly stand by — or that a majority of the population would allow them to — if regions like Bashkortostan in the southern Urals or Siberia, Russia’s “treasure chest,” where most if its natural resources lay buried, tried to break off.” That, again, is impossible to dismiss, however, the issue is the same: just because the colonial ruler such as Putin or his successor does not want the colonies to become free, does not mean that the colonies will not try.

Putin already made Russia’s Western borders blurry. There is no way other borders aren’t going to be revised or tested. The argument “if Russia loses, it will disintegrate which means war” carefully walks around the argument “if Russia is allowed to claim a victory in any way, Russia will become convinced that its selected course is just as correct as it was when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, and Russia will regroup and attack again.” The more likely subject of further attack is Ukraine, as Russia doesn’t control the territories it claimed to have annexed. Another likely subject is Kazakhstan and its northern territories that Russian propagandists, big and small, continue to claim were Russia’s historic land.

Perhaps it is time to start talking about the possibilities of denuclearization of Russia, and how this process might unfold in parallel to decolonization, and what perks can the new leadership receive if the leadership gives up nuclear weapons on its territory, and what fines it meets if the leadership doesn’t give up nuclear weapons.

By now, the article of Katnischig serves as a testament that many in the West do not want the collapse of Russia, fears such a collapse, and are not too curious about the peoples who populate Russia, what they want, or how they feel. The article does not quote any indigenous thinker or politician in Russia who, as a representative of one of those enigmatic “20 ethnicites” could have given a different perspective.

John Lennon in an AI image with sunflowers; curated by yours truly

 

The Reckoning is Coming: the Revelation of Russian Imperialism

On February 6, the Atlantic Council website published a short and precise essay by scholar Botakoz Kassymbekova “Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity.” Why do I call it precise? It hits all the soft spots of the discourse offering no false consolations that we got used to seeing from Russian opposition and Russian liberals focusing on defending Russia from what they perceive as a threat–from confrontation resulting from the Russian war.

Botakoz Kassymbekova outlines the faults of Russian society’s response to the war without mincing words: according to the polls, an overwhelming majority of Russians support the war. Quite a bit of talk from the public denies the overwhelming support, however it is widely confirmed by personal experiences that go beyond the “anecdotal evidence,” and Kassymbekova points it out: “Millions of Ukrainians have friends and family in Russia. Many report being shocked by the lack of compassion they have encountered since the start of the invasion. Rather than sympathy or concern, they have been confronted by cold indifference, outright denials, or pro-Kremlin propaganda tropes.” Everyone who spoke with the Russians after 2/24/2022, can confirm this. Even those who are “against war” do repeat some parts of the Kremlin-endorsed narratives.

It is indeed telling that Russians who ran from the war or mobilization (there were two waves of going out of the country, one after the invasion, and another, probably more numerous, after the first wave of mobilization was declared), did not stage the protest abroad. This is the fact that is not difficult to explain (away), as people who barely left the country can hardly be expected to protest for the cause, as they are busy with arranging living conditions and overwhelmed with the task of navigating the new unfamiliar environment–however this also cannot be diminished that when something is touching somebody seriously, these things cannot preclude people from expressing their opinions. Ukrainian refugees who had to run from the war, did find the possibility and energy for their protests–the reality is simply that Russians aren’t quite touched by the events the way Ukrainians are, despite what Russian liberals might argue portraying Russians as “also the victims” and sometimes “THE victims” of Russia’s invasion.

The roots of this apparent indifference Botakoz Kassymbekova sees in the Russian imperial project. As Kassymbekova and Erica Marat wrote in their other article, “The Kremlin’s propaganda builds on seeing Russia as both victimized by the West and entitled to regional dominance in the former Soviet territories,” they wrote. “In such Russian imperial imagination, enforcing the Russian language, culture, and rule on non-Russian populations is not colonialism but a gift of greatness.” (Source). Viewing Russian colonialism and expansion in favorable light precludes Russians from critiquing the Russian expansionist project in Ukraine. The victims are perceived as necessary, razed to the ground cities as unfortunate but inevitable, and Russian propagandists, such as Sladkov, are trying to riddle themselves of the question why does Ukraine put up the resistance at all, since, according to him, Ukraine and Ukrainians stand only to gain from being violently colonized by the Russians.

Russian imperialism, argues Botakoz Kassymbekova, remains at the roots of the Russian identity. Indeed, Russian history was hardly ever reconsidered or critiqued from the point of view of colonialism. The Soviet historiography did write about tsarism’s colonialism, only to turn to the imposition of the same standards of Russification across the territory that remained within reach of the new state.

“Hundreds of years ago, the messianic vision of the czars gave rise to the idea of Russia as the Third Rome and leader of Orthodox Christianity. In the twentieth century, this belief in imperial exceptionalism was harnessed to identify Russians as the nation that would save the world from capitalism and lead a global communist revolution.

Under Putin, the lyrics may have changed but the tune remains largely the same”, writes Kassymbekova.

She highlights that the notions of the “Russian world” are vaguer than the notions of the Orthodox faith or communist ideology. I have argued elsewhere that the Russian world of the late Putinism is fragmented, ideologically, because it does not contain a coherent ideology except for the idea that Russians and everything Russian are superior to everything else. Nevertheless, the invading Russia is trying to sell its aggression to various audiences as something they specifically want to hear. The Russian invasion is a communist revival for the left, a fight for the traditional values for the right, creation of an “emirate Donbas” as the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and his oligarchy partake in the invasion and are rewarded with property in Donbas, and so on. Since Russian ideology is something for everyone, it is nothing coherent in itself.

Botakoz Kassymbekova points out that Russian oppositionists and liberals oppose Putin but do not tend to oppose or even acknowledge the pervasive nature of Russian colonialism. Confronting Russian colonialism remains a problem for Russians.

She is highlighting that the national myths, self-recognition, and self-awareness as members of the nations are different for Russians and Ukrainians. Ukrainians tend to prioritize the individual over the state, and their national self-building is about resistance of being colonized and subsumed, which may be a part, I would add from myself, of the hysterics with which the Russian state portrays Ukraine as “anti-Russia.”

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The benevolent nature of Russian colonialism has hardly been a subject of doubt in the Russian public space

The “anti-Russianness” of Ukraine is in the perceived threat of democratic development in the “post-Soviet space” that the Russian autocracy sees as a threat. While Belarus and Kazakhstan are not being cast as “anti-Russia” by the Russians, just yet, as they did not drastically cut their past in the course of revolutions, as Ukraine did, that does not mean that they are spared of the Russian threats. It is worth remembering that Belarus and Kazakhstan had people’s protests that could have resulted in revolutions. Botakoz Kassymbekova says that the fact that Ukraine put up a massive fight galvanizes the civil society in the countries of the former USSR. Russian colonialism is widely discussed today, something that was not happening a year ago, before the start of the full-blown Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Ultimately though, if these discussions sift into the Russian public sphere at all, they are being viewed as the hostile actions and threats of the world reinforcing the self-victimization part as a pillar of Russian colonialism. Kassymbkova says, “It is up to Russian society itself to dismantle the country’s imperial identity in order to reckon with the horrors of Russia’s past and address the crimes of the current genocidal war.”

And yes, this is indeed the kind of work that only the citizens of the “Russian Federation” can conduct for themselves, however, there are doubts that Russians who hold the position of power and benefit from colonialism will want to conduct this work. We need to look at how other empires ended or transformed the way they do not practice such brutalities and genocidal land grabs with armed forces as Russia does. None of those ends to the empires came from the privileged strata in the societies. If empires were not defeated externally, then they imploded as a result of the critique of the oppressed and “the subaltern.” Russian colonialism will confront itself not sooner than being forced to do so.

A paradoxical situation of the moment consists in the disparity of the understandings that some scholars hold and the absence of public understanding of Russia as an imperial project. Not only in Russia, but in the West, in the East, and, most notably, in Africa, the Russian colonialism is still an “exception” rather than a rule, despite that Russia is currently waging a colonial, imperial war of the land grab and “re-education” of Ukrainian identity.